



Osservatorio Nessuno

# Bugbane: Simplifying consensual Android forensics

FOSDEM 2026

# Osservatorio Nessuno OdV - Intro

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Born in hacklabs and self-organized spaces, we remain rooted in our grassroots foundations.

# Osservatorio Nessuno OdV - HQ



# When you think spyware...



NEWSLETTERS SUBS

MORGAN MEAKER BUSINESS AUG 15, 2022 7:00 AM

## Spyware Scandals Are Ripping Through Europe

The latest crisis that rocked the Greek government shows the bloc's surveillance problem goes beyond the notorious NSO Group.



[Research](#) / [Advanced search](#) / [Greece's Predatorgate: The latest chapter in Europe's spyware scandal?](#)

### Greece's Predatorgate: The latest chapter in Europe's spyware scandal?

At a Glance -- 08-09-2022



After Hungary, Poland and Spain, Greece is the latest Member State accused of spying on journalists and opposition politicians. While the opposition is seeking transparency and is steadily increasing the pressure, the Greek government has acknowledged select surveillance operations but insists on their legality and categorically denies purchasing or using the commercial Predator spyware. This EPRS paper synthesises the fast-paced and highly politicised developments at national level and contextualises the European Union's responses. It refers to the EPRS study 'Europe's PegasusGate' for more information and possible ways forward.

AP CONTENT SOLUTIONS WHO WE SERVE INSIGHTS

Home — [News Highlights](#) — [Spotlights](#) — US-backed Israeli company's spywa

SPOTLIGHTS

### US-backed Israeli company's spyware used to target European journalists, Citizen Lab finds

# Europe is a spyware production and deployment hub

- **Spain & Italy** among the most **prolific producers** in the world

[techcrunch.com](#)

## How Barcelona became an unlikely hub for spyware startups

*Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchieri*

13–16 minutes

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Toward the end of 2023, an Israeli security researcher from Tel Aviv said that he was approached on LinkedIn with an opportunity to work abroad with "good pay." He said that the company's HR department told him that it was a "legitimate" offensive security company that was starting from scratch in Barcelona, Spain.

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- **EU** Countries with government-backed surveillance **scandals** include: **Greece, Spain, Italy, Serbia, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, ...**

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- **Israel** still partially leading the highly sophisticated market and **evidence of testing on Palestinians**<sup>a</sup>
- **EU** Countries with government-backed surveillance **scandals** include: **Greece, Spain, Italy, Serbia, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, ...**
- Attribution is generally really hard, and **burden of proof always on victims**

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<sup>a</sup><https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/11/devices-of-palestinian-human-rights-defenders-hacked-with-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-2/>

# You don't always need a million-dollar exploit chain

	\$\$\$	\$\$	\$
<b>Installation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ 0-click</li><li>○ 1-click + social</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ social + privesc</li><li>○ social + minor bugs</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ social</li><li>○ social + infra</li><li>○ social + unlocking</li></ul>
<b>Agent</b>	memory	memory/app	app
<b>Companies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ Paragon</li><li>○ NSO</li><li>○ Dataflow</li><li>○ Cyrox</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ RCS</li><li>○ Memento</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ SIO</li><li>○ IPS Intelligence</li><li>○ PC Tattletale</li><li>○ InnovaSpy</li></ul>
<b>Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ activists</li><li>○ journalists</li><li>○ dissidents</li><li>○ politicians</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ activists</li><li>○ journalists</li><li>○ dissidents</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ activists</li><li>○ employees</li><li>○ partners</li></ul>
<b>Complexity</b>	high	medium	low

# On the lower end



16 December 2024

Also available in [Español](#), [Français](#)

## Serbia: Authorities using spyware and Cellebrite forensic extraction tools to hack journalists and activists

OSSERVATORIO NESSUNO

### Cellebrite and the routine use of digital surveillance in Italy.

8 March 2025 - [Advocacy](#)

In recent years, authorities in several countries have intensified their use of digital surveillance tools to access mobile devices, often without proper adherence to legal procedures and without the informed consent of those affected—sometimes in blatant violation of existing laws, as demonstrated by the current [Paragon](#) and [Graphite](#) case. Osservatorio Nessuno recently assisted members of the No CPR Torino assembly (a collective opposing Italy's Centri di Permanenza per il Rimpatrio, detention centers for migrants awaiting deportation) in discovering that their phones had been unlocked and forensically analyzed using Cellebrite tools, without being given sufficient prior notice to allow their legal consultants to verify that the procedure was conducted lawfully.



# arachidi

## 2c. Intercettazione Telematica Attiva – SPYWARE

### *Disclaimer*

I casi che abbiamo potuto analizzare si basano tutti su smartphone, ma potrebbero essere installati anche su pc con tecniche simili; inoltre le tecniche di attacco potrebbero essere oggi diverse e più sofisticate.

Op Sismi: avvenuta infenzione di un dispositivo tramite uno spyware di stato dal nome "Spyrtacus".

Questa al momento è la terza volta che accade nel corso degli ultimi anni (da quel che ne sappiamo) e alcune parti dell'attacco accomunano tutti i casi che abbiamo potuto studiare.

Il costo nel 2023 è di 250€ (solo in caso di buon esito) per l'infezione, e di 170€ al giorno per il noleggio di una postazione pc con software di gestione.

## Forensics vs live detection

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- Mostly **applicable only if spyware is known**, or there's deep suspicion of infection (with manual analysis)
- Research: **static/dynamic analysis**, **anomaly detection**, difficult to do on device or without data collection

# Lower-hanging fruits: easier detection and more threat intel

## lower-hanging fruits

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# Consensual Forensics Methodology

# Civil Society Helplines

A victim reach out through an helpline or via trusted grass-roots collectives.

To perform an acquisition of the (suspected) infected device:



SOCIALTIC

Tecnología digital para el cambio social



SECURITY  
LAB



# Civil Society Helplines



**SOCIALTIC**  
Tecnología digital para el cambio social



SECURITY  
LAB



A victim reach out through an helpline or via trusted grass-roots collectives.

To perform an acquisition of the (suspected) infected device:

- A technician travels on-site to the victim
- The victim performs an acquisition with remote support from a technician
- The victim sends their device to the technician for analysis



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- It is developed in Python as a command-line tool
- Interpreting the results requires technical expertise
- Uses ADB via USB to connect to the device and extract relevant artifacts

- Developed to make the acquisition process easier for victims

# AndroidQF

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## AndroidQF

- Developed to make the acquisition process easier for victims
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- Written in Golang, compiled to a single binary


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## AndroidQF

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- Written in Golang, compiled to a single binary
- Exports an encrypted MVT-compatible acquisition
- The victim can share the export with a technician that uses MVT to analyse it

# Bugbane



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## Our goals:

- Create a user-friendly on-device tool



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- Create a user-friendly on-device tool
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- Remain cross-compatible with other open-source tools such has MVT/AndroidQF



## Our goals:

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- Improve civil society threat intelligence by making widespread analysis possible
- Scan acquisitions retroactively with updated Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
- Remain cross-compatible with other open-source tools such has MVT/AndroidQF

**But mainly: perform acquisitions and analyses locally on the target device**

# Bugbane - Wireless ADB

- Wireless ADB debugging!

## Wireless debugging

Use wireless debugging 

Device name  
Android SDK built for arm64

IP address & Port  
10.0.2.16:44405

---

 Pair device with QR code  
Pair new devices using QR code scanner

---

 Pair device with pairing code  
Pair new devices using six digit code

# Bugbane - Wireless ADB

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


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- **Wireless ADB debugging!**
- Available since Android 11+
- Grants the same privileges MVT requires, thus allowing 1:1 acquisitions
- Ironically, the same mechanism that low-end spyware use to escalate privileges

# Bugbane - Architecture



# Bugbane - UI

1:45 ⓘ Bugbane ⚡

Acquire Acquisitions

8 / 15

Completed env: 4.5 KB  
Completed dumpsys: 15.6 MB  
Completed files: 7.2 MB  
Completed bugreport: 6.7 MB  
Completed logs: 0.0 B  
Completed logcat: 13.0 MB  
Completed getprop: 23.3 KB  
Completed mounts: 23.3 KB  
Running packages: 13.5 KB

X Stop Acquisition Export Share

1:39 ⓘ ← Acquisition Details

Name: a48753b8-41e9-4d4e-ba24-54f57531ebdb  
Completed: Jan 13, 2026 4:47 PM  
Size: 57.2 MB

Run Analysis

Analysis Date	Indicator Version	Level
Jan 13, 2026 9:19 PM	c7882fe1	CRITICAL
Jan 13, 2026 8:23 PM	c7882fe1	CRITICAL

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Analysis date: Jan 13, 2026 9:20 PM

Potential spyware indicators were found in this analysis. For help and support, consider contacting a trusted helpline.

Contact support

Indicator of Compromise Found

Indicator of Compromise Found

# Bugbane - Limitations

## Research problems

- Can only catch known threats
- Threat actors can scrape public IOCs and update their obfuscation
- Saving artifacts on device can add evidences in case of seizures

## Improvements under development

- Secure the app by encrypting local data
- Reproducible update infrastructure
- False positives detection/prevention
- UX

# References

## Bugbane

- Osservatorio Nessuno OdV - <https://osservatorionessuno.org>
- Rowen S - <https://rwn.sh>

## Related projects

- MVT - <https://mvt.re>
- PTS - <https://pts-project.org>

## Support

- CiviCERT - <https://civicert.org>

*We have intentionally left out closed-source tools. Their lack of transparency, unclear data-collection practices, and weak integration with community processes make them unsuitable for community support.*

# Q&A

[osservatorionessuno.org](http://osservatorionessuno.org)

[bsky.app/profile/osservatorionessuno.org](https://bsky.app/profile/osservatorionessuno.org)

[mastodon.cisti.org/@0n\\_odv](https://mastodon.cisti.org/@0n_odv)

[github.com/osservatorionessuno](https://github.com/osservatorionessuno)